Replicator Dynamics and Evolutionary Stable Strategies in Heterogeneous Games

We generalise and extend the work of Iñarra and Laruelle (2011) by studying two person symmetric evolutionary games with two strategies, a heterogenous population with two possible types of individuals and incomplete information. Comparing such games with their classic homogeneous version vith complete information found in the literature, we show that for the class of anti-coordination games the only evolutionarily stable strategy vanishes. Instead, we find infinite neutrally stable strategies. We also model the evolutionary process using two different replicator dynamics setups, each with a different inheritance rule, and we show that both lead to the same results with respect to stability.

Systematic and evolutionary studies of the terrestrial gastropods Helicoidea and Pyramidula

178 p.

Phylogeography and non-invasive landscape genetics of the European pine marten ("martes martes" L. 1758) : insights into ancient and contemporary processes shaping genetic variation

283 p. : graf., map.

Unemployment rates and population changes in Spain

Published as an article in: Journal of Applied Economics, 2004, vol. VII, pages 47-76.

The First Occurrence in the Fossil Record of an Aquatic Avian Twig-Nest with Phoenicopteriformes Eggs: Evolutionary Implication

14 p.